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Abstract 
 
 
Watersheds are patchy landscapes, hard to understand and deal with. Previous scholarship 
investigated various institutional arrangements to tackle classical problems related to the 
overuse, misuse and mismanagement of water resources. While studies eloquently identified 
conditions under which individuals cooperate and avoid a “tragedy of the commons” scenario, 
they hardly scrutinized the role of power in designing and maintaining these arrangements. Using 
an analytical model inspired by political ecology and new institutionalism thinking, this study 
suggests a more subtle and profound analysis of how watershed arrangements have the potential 
to affect power dynamics and thus address water conflicts. By means of a case study in the 
Coello watershed, Colombia, and through qualitative empirical data, the research reveals how 
power is embedded and shifted in watershed interactions. It also explores how landscapes of 
power are redefined with the creation of benefit-sharing mechanisms (BSMs), as new 
institutional arrangements. The study further demonstrates that this theoretically-triangulated 
approach offers a more holistic understanding of biophysical and social systems such as 
watersheds, an invaluable point of departure for designing appropriate answers for current 
environmental, social and economic challenges.    
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Problem definition  
“...the ultimate answers to our environmental problems do not lie in how 
we meet the technical challenges before us... Watershed thinking can be 
an opportunity to strengthen our ability to work together, or it can 
represent the imposition of new authority that ultimately undermines 
collective decision making. The choice is ours, and making it 
courageously should be our first collective action”  
(Barham, 2010: 190) 
Watershed landscapes are patchy. Within these natural units ecosystems, actors and interests 
coexist. However, in a context where water and land resources are perceived as finite, this 
diversity raises several problems. One of them is power. Geographical location, social and 
economic status, personal endowments determine individual’s relative capacity to influence 
others by providing, restricting or punishing access to the resource. When this power is abused, it 
leads to instances of disobedience, conflict, and a “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968) is 
one step away from becoming the tenet of social interactions.  
But how can this Hobbesian state of nature be altered in such a way that nature, humans and the 
institutions they create coexist in harmony? Is there room for hope that powerful actors will 
abide by the rules and will share the benefits? If yes, at what price? And how should this new 
rearrangement of power dynamics look like, in order to make sure that both human development, 
economic and environmental sustainability goals are attained? 
Scholars have suggested many forms of institutional set-ups to deal with complex, common-pool 
resource (CPR) systems such as watersheds: from simple dialogues between actors, power 
sharing agreements, to more intricate multi-stakeholder fora or polycentric institutions. While 
each of these can contribute to a better management of the resource, none of these is a panacea 
(Faysse 2006; Ostrom 2007, 2010a, 2010b; Ostrom et al. 1961; Warner 2012). 
In the Coello watershed (Colombia) benefit-sharing mechanisms (BSMs) have been recently 
designed as a mean to address challenges related to water: uncontrolled expansion of the 
agricultural frontier, intensive and extensive cattle farming, deforestation, soil and water 
contamination, etc. These BSMs refer to different agreements signed between watershed 
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stakeholders to protect upper lands from human encroachment and other environmental risks and 
thus ensure headwater conservation.  
However, the landscape in this specific region is very diverse. The Coello watershed cuts 
through one of the country’s most important areas for agricultural production, which is also rich 
in gold resources. Water is intensely disputed between sectors (household consumption, 
agriculture and mining) and social groups (small-, medium-, and large scale farmers and 
upstream, midstream and downstream users). While this picture creates important dynamics 
between actors, the potential of these BSMs to change instances of conflict and contention into 
collective actions has yet to be uncovered.     
1.2 Purpose of the research 
For large, trans-boundary watershed landscapes a significant breadth of scholarship explored the 
extent to which new benefit-sharing arrangements can help reduce conflicts (Mapezda et al. 
2010; Sadoff and Grey 2002, 2005). However, for smaller (national) watershed units, it is often 
assumed that a fair distribution of benefits would diminish the potential for further conflicts 
(Candelo et al. 2008; Escobar and Estrada 2011; White et al. 2011).  
But I argue that conflicts and tensions between watershed actors can come in various forms and 
many of them are subtle and less intuitive. While perception of gains does influence cooperative 
behaviour, there are many instances where humans, regardless of their geographical location, do 
not derive direct or monetary benefits from the watershed management scheme. Therefore, the 
narrative about conflict and cooperation in watersheds is also a narrative about the resource 
structure itself and the values attached to it; about the power embedded in the social relations and 
negotiated between actors at different points and in different places in time; and about the 
institutional set-up that regulates human actions and interactions.  
Thus the purpose of this study is to take one step further from a pure analysis of benefit-sharing 
and institutional change and launch a discussion on how landscapes of power are portrayed in the 
watershed and how new institutional arrangements, regardless of their specific objective, may 
muddle through these different types of power, in order to address the various tensions and 
conflicts over water.  
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1.3 Research questions 
In order to achieve this aim, the study attempts to explore how power and cooperative behaviour 
in the watershed aroused (RQ1), how these dynamics led to new institutional arrangements 
(RQ2) and how the later are then able to affect these dynamics, feeding into relationships of 
power (RQ3).  The research process will be guided by the following research questions:  
RQ1: Which have been the main interactions and power relations related to water manifested 
between various actors in the Coello watershed, prior to the BSMs?  
RQ2: How have the new institutional arrangements (BSMs) to solve water related tensions in the 
watershed been developed?  
RQ3: How do the newly spawned interactions between actors affect power relations in the 
watershed and address previous water conflicts? 
The study takes a political ecology approach, considering power as an underlying component of 
any social relation, which is constantly contested and negotiated across multiple levels of 
interactions. It also draws on new institutionalism thinking, viewing institutions as a collection of 
rules and norms that are designed by humans but also able to influence individual behaviour. 
Triangulating these two major communities of thinking, the study presents an analytical model 
(Section 3.4.) that can provide a deeper, nuanced understanding of water conflicts and the 
potential to address them through benefit-sharing mechanism as new institutional arrangements.  
The paper deals with a single-case study research, focused on the Coello watershed in Colombia. 
All  three main components of the watershed were taken into account – uplands, midlands and 
lowlands, recognizing that interactions in watersheds appear at different levels and that shared 
interests may not necessarily be geographically-bound, but also manifested according to shared 
ideology, beliefs and traditions (Swallow et al. 2006).  
The study contributes to the new-institutionalism scientific dialogue on institutional change, 
recognizing that reflections on water resource management should engage thoughts about 
actors, actions and interactions at different levels, as well as about the social impacts of these 
processes. By highlighting the importance of relationships of power, the research proposes a 
holistic analysis of actions and interactions in the watershed which could facilitate a better 
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understanding of various social processes unfolding in watersheds, in addition to biophysical 
phenomena.   
1.4 Research outline 
The study commences with an overview of the study area (Section two). Section three reviews 
relevant literature on benefit-sharing in natural resource management and presents the theories 
that will guide the research: political ecology and new institutionalism. Then an analytical model 
is presented, based on these two theories and supplemented with personal contributions. In 
Section four the methodology of the study is presented. Section five is dedicated to answering 
the first research question (RQ1) relating to water conflicts and tensions identified prior to the 
design of BSMs. Section six provides answers for the second research question (RQ2) related to 
the development of the BSMs. Section seven deals with the last research question (RQ3) and 
explores the interactions generated by the BSMs, as well as the extent to which these have 
moved from conflict to cooperation dynamics in the watershed. The Concluding remarks section 
extends the discussion to the potential of BSMs, as agreements per se and as approach to 
manage watersheds, to solve water conflicts, as well as to the implications of integrating a 
political ecology approach when analysing institutions and institutional change. 
2 Overview of the study area 
2.1 Biophysical and socio-demographical characteristics 
The Coello watershed is the most important hydrological network in the Department of Tolima, 
Colombia. It is located on the eastern slope of the Andean Cordilleras and extends over a surface 
of 190.000 ha. Altitudinal variation (280-5200m), temperature gradients (2-28°C) and 
precipitation patterns (900-4000mm) create a diverse array of ecosystems: dry tropical forests, 
high mountain forests and high montane moorland (paramo1) (Johnson 2009: 16).  
The division of the upstream, midstream and downstream areas of the watershed corresponds to 
three altitudinal ranges 280m-1000m (lower), 1000m-1800m (middle) and above 1800m (upper). 
                                                          
1 The paramos are ecosystems found in a few Latin American countries only – Colombia (60% of total paramos are 
found in Colombia), Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru and Costa Rica and are located at altitudes higher than 3000m. 
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Figure 1 displays the distribution of these sectors, with the main municipalities in each area – 
Cajamarca (upper), Ibague (middle), Coello and El Espinal (lower).  
The Coello River and its tributaries benefits eight municipalities2 and approximately 41.000 
inhabitants (Cortolima 2006). In most of these municipalities, rural to urban migration has been a 
continuously growing trend. One of the factors has been the guerilla groups still operating in the 
upper parts of the watershed, which have compelled many people to flee to urban areas.    
Overall, the watershed’s economy is based on intensive small, medium and large-scale 
agriculture and cattle farming on hillsides, as well as on industrial activities and the service 
                                                          
2 The tributary rivers are: Tochecito, Toche, Anaime, Cócora, Gallego, Combeima and Bermellón. The 
municipalities are Cajamarca-Anaime, Ibagué, San Luis, Rovira, Valle del San Juan, El Espinal, Flandes and Coello.  
Figure 1: The Coello Watershed 
Source: CIAT and WWF (2013) 
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sector. The low municipal scores for the Unsatisfied Basic Needs Index3 reveal relatively high 
economic dependence, poor living conditions and public services (inadequate efficiency of 
sewage systems and aqueduct), especially in rural areas. Rural inhabitants also experience poor 
or lack of access to water supply, sewage and solid waste disposal systems, to public or private 
healthcare systems, or to primary and secondary education (Cantillo and Gonzales 2008).  
2.2 The three watershed landscapes  
The upper landscape is characterized by natural ecosystems such as forests, valleys, wetlands 
and paramo (approximately 39.000 ha, around 40% of the land use area) (Alcaldía de Cajamarca 
2012: 149). The paramo provides a range of ecosystem services, including high concentration of 
biodiversity (a wide range of endemic species), carbon-fixation and water regulation 
(Bethancourt 2007). Rivers originating in paramos are known for their “high and sustained flow” 
(Westermann 2007: 31) and contribute with 11.58 m³/s of water to the river basin (equivalent to 
38% of the total water resources in the Coello river basin). The area is a mixture between small- 
and large-scale farmers who own cattle or cultivate crops (beans, arracacha4, potatoes, fruits and 
other vegetables). Large cattle ranching estates are largely run by administradores in the absence 
of their owners.  
The middle landscape is dedicated to agricultural, cattle raising, commercial, industrial and 
mining activities. It also represents the department’s hub for agricultural production. Crop 
cultivation is usually on hillsides and includes: vegetables, arracacha, soybeans, sugarcane, rice, 
sorghum, beans, bananas, coffee and fruits. While land conversion for the expansion of 
agricultural and farming activities has been a trend, more recent tendencies are reflected in 
investments in the service and industrial sector. Small-scale (low-productivity) and medium 
properties prevail (Cortolima 2006: 923) and farmers invest considerably in pesticides and 
fertilizers to boost crop productivity.   
The lower landscape is considered the most important rice-producing centre in the country, an 
important regional nucleus for agriculture and industry (Cortolima 2006: 893). Soils in this part 
                                                          
3The Index is a tool for measuring poverty, describing the percentage of people vs. homes for the total population 
vs. total households having at least one unmet basic need. (DANE 2011a)  
4 Arracacha is a root vegetable that is originally from the Andean region. 
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of the watershed are apt for tropical commercial agriculture (permanent or perennial crops), as 
well as for intensive livestock farming. While the number of small-scale plots (< 1ha) is high 
(44% of total number), large scale rice plots (>10ha) occupy more than 60% of the total 
cultivated land. (Cortolima 2006: 923). Intensive cultivation of rice, sorghum, cotton and fruits 
require permanent irrigation (Falla 2012: 24). Rice requires most water resources, followed by 
fruit and coffee crops (Johnson 2009: 17).  
Water scarcity has not been a problem in the region, but inappropriate land use upstream and 
midstream led to soil erosion and sedimentation of riverbeds and reservoirs. Moreover, water 
quality is affected by household, animal and industrial waste from both rural and urban areas, as 
well as the intensive use of agrochemicals. The continuously increasing demand for water for 
irrigation and industrial activities, coupled with extreme events (flooding, droughts) further 
challenges the provision of water.  
Apart from individual and household decision-making, the management of the Coello watershed 
is the responsibility of Cortolima, the body that represents the government in environmental 
matters at regional level. Among others, it is responsible for granting water concessions to users 
and for leading the elaboration of the Watershed Management Plan and other environmental 
studies. The money from water charges is invested in environmental campaigns, reforestation 
activities and acquisition of upstream land. The Municipalities are responsible to ensure, via 
public or private supply services, such as community associations (comités de acueductos), 
access to potable water to the population. Usocoello, the water users association of Coello, 
administers the irrigation infrastructure in the watershed, which is the property of the Colombian 
Institute for Rural Development (INCODER), a regional state body. Appendix A provides a more 
detailed picture of the responsibilities of each actor in the watershed.  
3  Towards a new analytical framework to analyse benefit-
sharing mechanisms 
 
The section provides an overview of experiences of benefit-sharing mechanisms for natural 
resource management (NRM). Then I move to a discussion of major theories underpinning the 
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study: political ecology and new institutionalism. Based on these theories, I present an analytical 
model for studying benefit-sharing mechanisms in watersheds.  
 
3.1 Benefit-sharing: from principles to mechanisms   
Social groups are heterogeneous and the most vulnerable and disempowered often bear the 
lowest benefits and highest costs from NRM5, given governance, community and resource-
related conditions (Watts 1983). This has triggered numerous efforts to understand and design 
solutions for equitable NRM, via economic valuation studies (Escobar and Estrada 2011; 
Quintero et al. 2005, Quintero et al. 2006; Quintero and Otero 2006; Quintero et al. 2009, 
Quintero et al. 2011; White et al. 2011) or research exploring community perceptions of values, 
benefits and costs related to the resource (Kiersch and Tognetti 2002; Mahanty et al. 2007). 
Special attention has been given to trans-boundary contexts (Lautze and Giodano 2008; Mapezda 
et al. 2010; Sadoff and Grey 2002, 2005; Wolff 1999, 2001). 
Scholars have distinguished between monetary benefits – e.g. income from ‘selling’ the natural 
resource, from employment in resource protection activities, or from changes in productivity - 
and non-monetary benefits such as access and use rights, or environmental benefits (biodiversity 
conservation, flood control, carbon sequestration, etc.) (Escobar and Estrada 2011; Mahanty et 
al. 2007; White et al. 2011). Based on a review of the work of Sadoff and Grey (2002) on trans-
boundary water management, Mapezda et al. (2010) argued that benefits can go beyond the 
resource (“benefits beyond the river”), thus  referring to empowerment, knowledge, conservation 
of cultural values, improved communication, markets and trade, regional stability, etc. 
Since benefits are perceived differently by individuals and since governance and community 
conditions vary, it is difficult to design a universal mechanism that can ease tensions between 
resource providers and users, all the while providing benefits to the rural poor. For this reason an 
array of BSMs have been developed including compensation schemes, ecosystems restoration 
schemes - through payments for environmental/watershed schemes (PES/PWS), payments for 
removing pollution, buying land for conservation, declaration of resource conservation areas, 
                                                          
5 These opportunity costs may refer to time, access to other income-generating resources, traditional (collective) 
practices and rights, negotiation, conflict-management and monitoring mechanisms, etc. 
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etc., as well as community development or livelihood enhancement projects (FAO 2004; 
Mahanty et al. 2007; White et al. 2011). 
In the Andes, there have been a growing number of efforts to design institutional mechanisms for 
benefit-sharing. They relate to trust funds, public-private partnerships for land purchases in 
critical catchments areas, investments in productive activities as compensation for banning 
resource exploitation in protected areas (Garzon 2010; Quintero 2010; White et al. 2011). In 
Colombia, several BSMs have been identified: commercial plantations for sustainable 
reforestation and hydrological regulation, biodiversity conservation and alternative production, 
soft loans for upstream users who commit to organic agriculture, voluntary community funds to 
compensate for upstream land and water conservation activities, etc. (Garzon 2010).  
However, reduced water-related conflicts as a result of BSMs have yet to be demonstrated. 
Rather, it was assumed that a fair distribution of benefits would inevitably reduce divides 
between users and providers and thus help mitigate conflicts (Candelo et al. 2008; Quintero et al. 
2011; White at al 2011).  
3.2 Political ecology 
I use political ecology to understand how diverse manifestations of power influence interactions 
among watershed actors (conflict, cooperation). At large, political ecology is concerned with 
how power is distributed and negotiated in social relations at different scales and how this 
permanent contestation of power shapes environmental discourses and conflicts. These 
theoretical thoughts will guide the entire analytical process, for answering all research questions.  
Ever since its first theoretical underpinnings in the 1970s political ecology has been invigorating 
the study of the environment, by assimilating various theories in order to enquire into the 
complex relationships between humans and nature and the influence of power structures on these 
interactions: from anthropology and cultural ecology, to disaster and hazard studies and wider 
political economy theories (Paulson and Gezon 2008; Robbins 2012). Therefore, Robbins (2012) 
called this line of thinking a “community of practice” rather than a theory on its own. 
While there is no clear-cut definition for political ecology, scholars have used this approach in 
order to analyse the different forms of access and control over natural resources and their impact 
    
A. Nowak: Pockets of Hope, Pockets of Power| 10 
on society and the environment (Watts 2000), how rural-urban and local-global linkages impact 
on environmental change (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987), how politics and political economy 
shape “environmental discourses” (Stott and Sullivan 2000).  
One of the merits of political ecology is the suggestion to zoom out the focus from the local to 
the global, in order to better understand the fundamental causes of natural systems disruptions. 
Humans are viewed as part of a larger system, and their behaviour and actions on the 
environment determined by larger forces, such as international markets and political regimes. 
The local-global nexus, argue the theorists, coupled with the multiple values, interests and 
discourses attached to the environment, shapes relationships of power and ultimately leads to 
environmental conflicts (Hornborg 2001; Paulson and Gezon 2008; Robbins 2012).   
This perspective allows the analysis to cover a breadth of different scopes, oscillating between 
the local, regional and national level and delving into how local actions and interactions and 
knowledge are shaped by wider “political and economic upheaval” (Robbins 2012: 84). It serves 
as foundation for reflection on how wider efforts to open up the national economy to the 
globalizing forces (e.g. hosting multinational mining companies) and the declaration of 
conservation reserves as a way to align to international standards impact relations between local 
and regional actors and eventually create further local pockets of power (Swallow et al. 2006).  
Power, understood as “a social relation built on asymmetric distribution of resources and risks” 
(Hornborg 2001: 1), is embedded in every sphere of society. It has been defined by political 
ecologists as “the ability of one actor to control the environment of another” (Bryant 1998: 86). 
Power is constantly redefined, negotiated and shifted across actors and spaces (Paulson and 
Gezon 2008; Robbins 2012).  
However, while political ecology tends to view power more from a domination or dependency 
perspective, I argue that such an approach may limit our understanding about social 
relationships, how they occur and change. This means that we need to strip power of its 
destructive, counterproductive connotation. Atlee and Atlee (2008) discuss different 
manifestations of social power (governmental, political, economic, personal, physical, etc.), 
highlighting that this becomes destructive only when it is concentrated, with no system of 
checks-and-balances and lack of accountability (See Appendix B). Then, what we have to do is 
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to explicitly define the type of power before judging it, because the way we think about power 
affects the way we see social relations (Baldwin 1978).  
Political ecology further holds that society is encumbered with zero-sum games. Degradation is 
impacted differently by different social groups and is also felt differently. The task of political 
ecology is then to explore how inequities are generated (Ferguson and Derman 2008: 62) and 
why they persist. Moreover, relationships between human and natural resources (e.g. the use of 
land and water) are politically embedded and in fact social, political, economic and ecological 
marginalization drive poverty and consequently land degradation (Fiona and Mackenzie 2008).  
This being said, the rationale for using political ecology in this study is not because it is a silver-
bullet answer to the research questions. Rather, because it helps us realize how dynamic human-
environment and human-institutions interactions are and how much this entanglement impacts 
the way water is used and conserved. Political ecology is then a “myth-busting research” 
(Robbins 2012: 99), that helps digging into how power relations may emerge from and generate 
conflicts and cooperation.  
 
3.3 New institutionalism  
While political ecology’s boundless merit is to provide a critical lens to analyse problems 
occurring in complex socio-ecological systems (SES) 6  and their root causes, the vast 
contributions of new institutionalism thinking help analysing if and how these problems could be 
addressed. Hence, I am using new institutionalism thinking to explore the institutional change 
process in the watershed (the emergence of the BSMs), which mainly refers to RQ2, but also 
how institutions shape individual behaviour and how and why actors cooperate (RQ1 and RQ3).  
Institutions have been contemplated as “humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction” (North 1991: 3). For new institutionalism theorists like Elinor Ostrom, institutions 
are a set of rules created by and for individuals that stipulate who decides what, what actions can 
be taken and how, as well as how individual actions can be integrated into collective actions 
(Ostrom 1990, 1999, 2000, 2007). They provide “expectations, stability and meaning that are 
                                                          
6 (SES): systems composed of resource system (e.g. watershed), resource units (water), users (inhabitants; 
agriculture), and governance systems (rules and organizations governing watershed management) that are in a 
permanent interaction and produce effects at SES level (Ostrom 2009). 
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essential to human existence and coordination” (Vatn 2005: 60). In fact, sociological approaches 
claim that institutions are omnipresent, “from handshakes to marriages to strategic planning 
departments” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 9; Young 1986). This research takes the approach of 
anthropological, sociological and economic studies that view institution as rules, rather than as 
organizations per se – an approach mostly found in political science (Vatn 2006: 2). 
Scholars also distinguished between institutions imposing restrictions on individuals7 and those 
shaping individual values, perceptions and actions (DiMaggio and Powel 1991; Vatn 2006). Vatn 
(2006) also distinguished between coordinating institutions (especially in cooperation situations) 
and conflict-regulating institutions that can mitigate tensions between natural resource users and 
their divergent values and interests.    
Institutional theory highlighted institutions’ contribution to shaping individual’s behaviour and 
decisions, which allows an analysis of how various arrangements and rules meant to harmonize 
the relation between humans and nature evolved throughout time (Gomez-Bagghetun and 
Kelemen 2008; Holling et al. 2002; Leach et al. 1999). Accordingly, individual and collective 
choice influences and, reciprocally is influenced by institutions.  
Most analyses focused on the emergence of new arrangements for natural resource management 
– that could guarantee the three pillars of sustainability: social, economic and environmental – 
are heavily influenced by the work of Elinor Ostrom and her efforts to reorient the thinking about 
CPRs. Previously, CPRs were considered inevitable social dilemmas, with individual and group 
rationality in permanent tension. Key concepts of this thinking – the prisoner’s dilemma (Tucker, 
1950), the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968) and “the logic of collective action” (Olson 
1965) – pessimistically highlighted that individuals would not make collective choices because 
the gains from a free-riding, individual action situation are always greater than from a 
cooperative situation . 
Elinor Ostrom’s main preoccupation was to find the conditions under which cooperative 
institutions are created and sustained in order to avoid overuse and mismanagement of natural 
resources. She argued that rational individuals don’t act in a vacuum, because their decisions are 
                                                          
7 In this case, individuals decide whether to abide or not to “the rules of the game” (North 1991), based on a 
rational-choice calculus.  
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inevitably linked with others’ decisions (and the socialization context). The credo that there is 
also social rationality, alongside individual rationality (Vatn 2005) has also been embraced by 
political ecologists: “commons users are not isolated decision makers but…live in communities 
where they can mutually monitor and communicate, and…tragedy game players can watch 
outcomes unfold and adapt their decisions in later ‘rounds of play’” (Robbins 2012: 53).  
Insisting upon the manifold conditions for the emergence of locally-designed institutions that 
CPR scholarship has identified would maybe require a separate in-depth study. However, it 
suffices to say that studies highlighted the importance of characteristics related to the resource, 
users, the institutions and the external environment for the effectiveness of these local collective 
efforts. For instance, some critical conditions refer to small-sized user groups and resource 
systems, shared norms, trust, land ownership, simple, easy to enforce rules, monitoring 
mechanisms to hold officials accountable, fair allocation of benefits from the resource, etc. 
(Agrawal 2003; Baland and Plateau 1996; Isaac and Walker 1998; Lubell 2002; Ostrom 1990; 
Poteete and Ostrom 2003; Wade 1988). Appendix C provides Kerr’s (2007) comprehensive 
compilation of these contributions. However, as previous research has it, these conditions can be 
problematic, since they “rarely characterize watershed management” (Kerr 2007: 95). 
The debate on the most appropriate institutional arrangement for solving CPR problems has also 
been extensive. In general, research has held that the integration of local knowledge and 
experience can lead to better decisions (Berkes 2009; Dietz et al. 2003). However, scholars have 
also shown that in various instances such arrangements can turn into discourses of powerful 
actors so as to hide perverse interests and elite capture or to mask different interests and roles 
within communities (Barham 2010; Blaikie 2006; Christie et al. 2000; Cook and Kothan 2001; 
Corbridge and Kuman 2002; Haller et al. 2012; Mahanty 2011).   
CPR scholarship has proposed new forms of cooperation, such as multi-stakeholder processes 
(Cohen 2011; Faysse 2006; Ore 2012; Warner 2012) or polycentric institutions (Borrini-
Feyerabend et al. 2004; Ostrom 2010a, 2010b; Ostrom et al., 1961). These “creative 
governance” approaches (Warner 2012: 10) are based on the idea that decision-making must be 
diffused across different canters and scales, in order to prevent accumulation of power and elite 
capture. Moreover, the presence of multiple canters helps stronger systems compensate for 
weaker ones: “polycentric system exists when multiple public and private organizations at 
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multiple scales jointly affect collective benefits and costs.” (Ostrom 2010a: 355). What makes 
the approach different from anarchy is the presence of rules and clear division of authority. 
Trust, knowledge, innovation, cooperation are some important benefits of polycentric institutions 
(Ostrom 2010b: 552). It is these processes that this research will mostly refer to. 
 
3.4 A model to analyse BSMs in watersheds  
For the purpose of the study, using one theory only means providing incomplete answers to the 
research questions. For instance, new institutionalism, although broad in its scope, falls short of 
addressing power relations in managing common-pool resources (CPR) and how power may 
affect and be affected by the new institutional arrangements. In its turn, political ecology, which 
does focus on power relations, does not highlight enough the potential of cooperation between 
actors at different scales, so as to prevent environmental degradation.  
Thus, the analytical model (Figure 2) suggests a fusion between these two approaches, allowing 
us to seize on the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of each theory, equipping the study 
with the appropriate tools to explore environmental conflicts and institutional change as part of 
the same picture. 
I argue that the watershed is a complex landscape composed of different socio-ecological and 
political systems (Saravanan 2007). It is not only the multitude of geographies, resources and 
hydrological services that frames the watershed, but also a variety of actors, interests and types 
of relationships which are time and space bound and which determine the way land and water is 
used and managed.  
The resource structure refers to the condition of water (quality, quantity) as perceived by the 
inhabitants. Actor refers to any farmer/inhabitant, water user association or decision-making 
body that affects and is affected by water use and management. Institution refers to the rules and 
norms to regulate behaviour regarding water use and management. Given its purpose, this study 
only refers to formal institutions, but the model can be equally applied for the analysis of 
informal institutions.  
As Wegerich (2001:7) indicated, the debate on what came first – the actor or the structure 
(institution) - can be counterproductive, because there is no straightforward answer. The 
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boundary between the concepts is very fluid and therefore the alternative is to design an analysis 
which is “actor and structure specific in a time and a spatial framework”. Therefore, this study 
does not justify a particular stance to this debate, but rather analyses the watershed actors and the 
institutions to manage the resource and the way these two generate different types of interactions 
and relationships of power.           
 
These being said, the model distinguishes between first-level interaction (actor-resource) and 
second-level interactions (actor(s)-actor(s)). These are influenced by contextual conditions and 
wider scale conditions. 
The model suggests that there is always a type of interaction (conflict or cooperation) among 
actors, given the reliance on the same water resources and the same formal rules (Sadoff and 
Figure 2: An analytical model to analyse benefit-sharing mechanisms  
Source: The author  
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Grey 2005). Herein, conflict can refer to a tension (a conflict of interests) and not necessarily to 
violence or direct clashes.  
In accordance with new institutionalism thinking the model suggests that, in an initial stage, 
institutions influence and are influenced by actor-resource interactions. This represents the 
period preceding the BSMs.  
Second-level interactions and contextual conditions - taken individually - influence the creation 
of new institutional arrangements (BSMs in this case), which would be either responses to 
conflict situations (acting as conflict-resolution mechanisms), a consequence of cooperative 
behaviour (arising, for example, from high environmental awareness) or a combination of the 
two. The Venn diagrams for types of interactions suggest that.  
This also marks the beginning of the stage preceding the BSM creation. In their turn, the new 
institutions generate forms of cooperation or conflict which on short, medium and long term will 
determine the resource structure, new first-level and second-level interactions. Thus, the 
continuum chain illustrated by the big arrow suggests, as new institutionalists also argued, that a 
certain type of institution is not a silver bullet, that institutions are continuously reshaped through 
people’s practices, actions and interactions, in order to adapt them to changing environments 
(Mollinga et al. 2007).  
Finally, there are three wide-scale conditions that affect all the processes related to benefit-
sharing. First, the socio-economic and political context that influences institutions, resource 
access and use, actors’ interests, the interactions between these and the set-up and functioning of 
the new institutional arrangements. A focus on this condition helps us put into a wider context 
every aspect of the analysis.  
Second, the scale linkages that refer to the idea that the different interactions develop at local-
regional-national scale and that the functioning of one influences and is influenced by the 
functioning of the other (Robbins 2012). Additionally, upstream-midstream-downstream 
landscapes are interlinked through the vertical flow of water, but also through the variety of 
actors and rules that affect the entire watershed. These interactions are situated at an intra-
community level, but also at basin, national and wider level and are aimed at influencing the type 
of activity within each watershed landscape (Swallow et al. 2006).   
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Lastly, social power, as observed in Section 3.2, is embedded in the contextual conditions 
(resource, actors, institutions) and in all types of interactions. Additionally, it is permanently 
shifting, as people interact and negotiate their roles and opportunities to act (Paulson and Gezon 
2008; Hornborg 2001). 
Therefore, by situating the analysis of watershed management at the intersection between new 
institutionalism and political ecology, the study will help create a more comprehensive picture of 
the context preceding and following the design of BSMs.  
4 Methodology 
This section discusses the main approaches and methods used in the study. Ethical considerations 
and limitations of the study are discussed throughout the section, to ensure text consistency.  
 
4.1 Research approach 
The qualitative approach to this study was informed by the belief that objects and meanings are 
products of our ideas and that reality is socially constructed. In line with previous studies, this 
research asserts that ideas about the environment, social power and social interactions are in 
permanent redefinition and dependent on the meanings human attach to these phenomena 
(Bryant 1998; Escobar 2006; Robbins 2012). Hence, recognizing the importance of engaging 
different discourses about the world, a study about watershed management, power relations and 
conflicts becomes a story about research participants’ experiences and beliefs and not so much 
about researchers’ prefabricated assumptions and definitions (Bryman 2008).  
The qualitative nature of the research enabled the collection of data from multiple types of 
sources and perspectives, which facilitating a deeper, holistic understanding of the social world 
presented – drivers of environmental degradation, power dynamics in the watershed, etc. 
(Creswell 2009: 38). Rather than bringing the participants to the lab, this approach helped me 
immerse into their daily life and thus make sense “how they behave and act within their context”, 
opportunity that quantitative approaches hardly allow for (Creswell 2009: 37). However, this 
perspective may introduce some bias, since bringing participants in the vanguard of the research 
    
A. Nowak: Pockets of Hope, Pockets of Power| 18 
also means lifting up researcher’s authority, via interpretation. But, as Creswell remarked (2009: 
177; 43), in qualitative research one can hardly avoid leaving own blueprints on the study; 
qualitative data “is all about interpretation” and this is visible in the selection of the research 
methods, of informants and interview questions and in the way the analysis process unfolds.  
 
4.2 The case study approach 
The research took the Coello watershed as the unit of analysis and gave more weight to the 
upstream area -a case-within-a-case approach (Bryman 2008)- since the BSMs were 
implemented in this specific part of the watershed. Through in-depth, detailed analysis of the 
“bounded system” (Creswell 2009: 73) the study sought to explore power relations and conflicts 
in the watershed prior to the development of BSMs but also to explain how these mechanisms 
affected power dynamics and conflicts within the same unit of analysis.  
Adopting this research method, the study’s ambition was to add to the body of knowledge on the 
topic, by providing a triangulated theoretical lens to analyse watershed institutions in a context of 
power dynamics. Effectiveness of BSMs in alleviating water conflict is context-specific, since 
power relations and interactions depend on time, space and participants’ perceptions. Therefore, 
the study does not claim that the findings in the Coello site are universally applicable. 
 
4.3 Data collection  
Secondary data was drawn from a thorough review of literature on benefit-sharing, political 
ecology and new institutionalism but also from national statistics, reports and other 
documentation relevant to the study. Reliance on locally-produced data (e.g. population, surface 
area, type of land tenure, etc.) has been kept to a minimum, since this data appeared to be many 
times contradictory. Instead, for gathering socio-demographic the study resorted to national 
statistics and to individual perceptions.  
The empirical inquiry involved triangulation of data via: 33 semi-structured interviews, two 
group discussions and several informal discussions, participant observations, situation 
observations and transect walks. These were conducted during repetitive visits to the field, 
between September 2012 and March 2013 (Appendix H). Even though the methods chosen 
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elicited data sufficient and detailed enough for answering the questions, an ethnographic 
approach could have added value to the study, since understanding more complex social relations 
and institutions requires a prolonged immersion in the study area (Mikkelsen 2005).  
However, this shortcoming was compensated with preliminary visits to the field, transect walks 
and prolonged participant and situation assessment prior to the commencement of the interviews. 
These methods facilitated an understanding of the study area (both the environment and the 
people in their daily life activities) but also of the actors’ behaviour and interactions during the 
negotiation process of the BSMs which took place in September 2012. Such prior engagements, 
argued scholars, are also valuable for improving the study’s credibility (Lincoln and Guba 1985).  
 
Research participants: identification and engagement 
The sample (n=46) reflects the diversity of actors engaged in water management. Several criteria 
were considered: location in the watershed (upstream, midstream, downstream), role (users, 
providers, decision-makers) and gender (in the case of farmers). Group discussions were not 
carried out separately with men and women, since the purpose of the study was not to analyse 
BSMs from a gender perspective. However, in order to ensure that both women and men were 
given voice in the research, gender balance was attempted when building the sample. Appendix 
E, F and G illustrate a detailed list of participants. 
An initial stakeholder mapping exercise was carried out with two gatekeepers, representatives of 
the local organization Semillas de Agua (SA) and the WWF Colombia, both with more than ten 
years of experience in working with the communities in the watershed. The exercise facilitated 
an early understanding of various interests and complex problems in the watershed (Ramirez 
1999). The gatekeepers also helped in establishing the first contacts with the authorities.   
For further identification of research participants I used a constructivist inquiry approach. New 
respondents were selected as a result of discussions with previous participants who noted the 
relevance of other actors in watershed management (German et al. 2006). Even though 
purposeful sampling may sometimes introduce researcher bias, unlike random sampling 
(Creswell 2009), it helped make sure that people with different interests, stakes, and 
socioeconomic conditions were selected. I tried to reduce eventual bias for using information 
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coming only from the gatekeepers by also relying on convenience sampling - selecting 
respondents as they were available for interviews or discussions without having the research 
question in mind - and snow-ball methods – for establishing contacts through previous 
participants.  The sampling ended when information started to be redundant (theoretical 
saturation) (Bryman 2008:100-110).   
Even if the case study was mostly based on the upstream area, I considered it essential to include 
inhabitants from all three parts, since they are the main sources of local knowledge and “the 
source and creators of value” (Escobar 1996: 57) and since their different opportunities to access, 
control and conserve water resources helps us analyse conflicts within and among communities. 
However, weight was given to upstream farmers, since their agricultural activities impact water 
flow in the watershed, but also because they live in the proximity of private conservation or 
publicly protected areas, many times invading these lands for cattle farming.  
For safety reasons8, inhabitants of the paramo were difficult to get in touch with. Engaging 
downstream and upstream large-scale farmers was also challenging, since most of them live in 
the capital city and are hard to reach. However, I managed to get in touch with two locals people 
who were administering some of these lands in the land owners’ absence and one paramo ranger.   
The interviews took place in people’s homes and the public offices. They lasted between 60 and 
90 minutes, except for the group interviews which took between two and three hours each. All 
discussions were carried in Spanish. Participants had no confidentiality protection requirement9. 
However, for practical reasons I developed codes for each participant. Since many of them 
refused to disclose their exact age, I created age categories (Appendix E, F and G). For recoding 
the data, I used both a digital recorder and notes-taking, in order to facilitate the data analysis 
process.    
Preliminary findings were shared with research participants two times (Appendix H). Apart from 
being an invaluable opportunity for feedback, this was also a manifestation of reciprocity, since 
                                                          
8 Guerilla and paramilitary groups are still operating in the remote mountenaous areas in the region and this 
prevented me from visiting these areas.  
9 Participants were asked at the beginning of each interview if they would like their name to remain confidential and 
also kindly asked to sign the terms of reference of the research. 
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knowledge sharing was one of their preconditions in participating in the research.   
Semi-structured interviews 
A total of 33 semi-structured interviews were conducted. They were intended to gather relevant 
data on interests for water, perceptions of watershed conflicts, reflections about the BSMs 
created, etc. in a structured manner (Bryman 2008). The open-ended questions allowed 
interviewees to answer freely to the questions (Dewalt and Dewalt 2002). Appendix I and J 
contain two samples of the interview guides used during the data collection process for farmers 
and institutional representatives respectively. 
Group discussions (GD) 
Two group discussions were conducted with upstream and downstream users respectively, who 
took part in the design of the BSMs and are now part of the Watershed Monitoring Committee. 
They were conducted separately with upstream (n=5) and downstream (n=4) inhabitants, in order 
to avoid eventual tensions between the group members during the discussion. The aim of these 
GD was to understand how the participants now make sense of watershed management and 
cooperation as part of a collective, but also to elicit multiple perspectives on water conflicts and 
power relations (Bryman 2008: 475-476). This method also helped collect systematic data from 
more participants in a shorter timeframe. 
The GD started with an actors and problem mapping exercise, complemented with a stepping-
stone activity, where participants were asked to talk about the evolution of the institutional 
arrangements in the watershed (prior and after the BSM). For this, symbolic stones and prompt 
notes were used. Participants were then encouraged to discuss how they make sense about inter- 
and intra-community cooperation, how they, as a collective, interact, what are the benefits and 
potential threats to the newly designed BSMs, etc.  
Informal discussions 
Repeated informal discussions were carried out with members of WWF and SA during in-person 
meetings but also via Skype and email. They offered valuable feedback and background 
information on the context of the watershed, about relevant stakeholders, and the design and the 
implementation of the BSMs, since both were part of the BSM process.   
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4.4 Data analysis and interpretation 
Data collection and analysis were conducted in tandem. For data analysis, I used an 
interpretational approach (Gall et al. 1996). Recorded data was transcribed and then segmented 
into meaningful units. When locating relevant, repetitive segments, I developed inductive codes. 
Diagramming showing relationships between segments and hierarchical category systems were 
developed, in order to facilitate the analysis (Bryman 2008).  
Because the study relies to large extents on participants’ perceptions of reality, I used their 
quotes throughout the study, turning participants into “co-constructors” of the research. 
However, researcher bias in a qualitative study situation is almost unavoidable, since it involves 
large degrees of author’s interpretation of these multiple realities presented, a phenomenon that 
is inherently linked with author’s own life experience, education and own beliefs about the world 
(Creswell 2009).   
4.5 Credibility and dependability 
For qualitative studies, concepts such as credibility (trustworthiness, validity) and reliability 
(dependability) have been intensively debated. In this case, various methods suggested in the 
literature (Bryman 2008; Creswell 2009; Lincoln and Guba 1985) have been used in order to 
ensure that the research processes are clearly defined and appropriate and that the conclusions 
drawn are congruent with reality (credibility, or internal validity). The studied relied on 
triangulation of information from multiple data, including a thorough literature review of 
previous findings on the topic, which strengthened the theoretical and empirical basis upon 
which the research is based. An initial trip to the field and participation in the negotiation of the 
BSMs helped ensure that the context is familiar with the researcher and that conclusions drawn 
are not based on assumptions, but on observed facts during participant and situational 
observation (Lincoln and Guba 1985).  
Additionally, the research benefited two times from “member check”, a situation where research 
participants had the opportunity to give feedback on the preliminary results and judge whether 
these were congruent with reality. This is how the idea focusing on conflicts between small- and 
large-scale farmers and intra-institutional tensions emerged.  Additionally, peer scrutiny from 
LUMID and CIAT colleagues helped shaping a new perspective over power in society, 
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emphasizing its “beneficial” dimension. Last but not least, expert review from the supervisor but 
also from the gatekeepers who know the research context very well ensured that the study is 
based on valid, strong arguments and that the analytical model is pertinent enough, given the 
reality in the field. 
5 Beyond water: silent conflicts, loud powers   
This section refers to the period prior to the design of BSMs and seeks to provide answers to 
RQ1. It draws on political ecology in order to better understand the deep roots of the inhabitants’ 
environmental degradation discourses, but also on parts of new institutionalism theory, to show 
how institutional absence/unfitness impacts actions and interactions in the watershed. Departing 
from community level-tensions (Section 5.1) and moving up the discussion towards broader 
economic and political claims (Section 5.2), I apply the analytical model (Figure 2, p.15), in 
order to demonstrate that the drivers of the diverse conflicts are much more subtle and shrouded 
in institutional arrangements that can cross the borders of the watershed.  
 
5.1 Water in rainbow community landscapes 
As illustrated in the analytical model (Figure 2), the resource structure and the actors are two 
important predictors for the type of interaction in the watershed. Where water resources are 
scarce and of poor quality conflicts of interests and tensions between resource users and 
providers are more likely to occur (Ferguson and Derman 2008).  
Prior to the BSMs, the watershed landscape was a place where communities were packed with 
different stretches of power. As political ecologists claim, there are power differentials in every 
social relation (Bryant 1998; Hornborg 2001; Robbins 2012). With regards to water, two 
categories of powerful decision-makers stood out: upstream farmers, who had direct access to the 
water sources and could decide, uninhibitedly, how to manage their land and water resources, 
thus affecting midstream and downstream users. Secondly, there were the owners of big stretches 
of land and with access to large irrigation systems, given their financial and technical assets.  
In the first case, we had an illustration of a classical upstream-downstream tension, driven by 
upstream users’ practices - intensive and extensive crop and animal farming activities on 
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hillsides, deforestation and slash-and-burn methods, invasion of private and public conservation 
areas for cattle ranching - and the consequences felt in the lower reaches: contaminated water, 
resource scarcity in times of drought, siltation. One small-scale downstream farmer claimed:  
…the way they manage their land affects us a lot, even though we live further down. In the rainy 
season, it’s then when we often have no water – neither for household consumption nor for 
farming. A lot of eroded land falls into the water… and this amount of sedimentation… the 
aqueduct cannot take it. So they [the authorities] have to close it until water flow regulates again. 
Meanwhile, we have no water… (DRP7) 
Research also found that water was also highly disputed between smallholders and largeholders, 
irrespective of their geographical location. Upstream smallholders– most of them crop farmers, 
victims of violent conflict displacement10 – were living on lands leased by the state for future 
mining activities; they were food peddlers, because access to formal markets was practically 
inexistent; agriculture was unproductive, given their low access to fertilizers and credit schemes. 
On the other hand, largeholders had clear land titles, access to formal markets, yet their cattle 
ranching activities put high pressures on the land and water bodies; the majority of them did not 
manage land directly, but via administrators, who were practically seasonal village workers.  
These power differentials allowed for different pressures exercised over the natural resources, 
especially in the upper reaches. But, as pointed out in the literature, actors do not act in a 
vacuum. Their behaviour is also driven by norms and rules (Mollinga et al. 2007; Ostrom 1990, 
1999, 2000, 2007, 2009; Vatn 2005, 2006). 
As suggested by political ecology theorists (Bryant 1998; Paulson and Gezon, 2008; Peet and 
Watts 1996; Robbins 2012), I zoomed out the focus to search for supplementary explanations for 
these power differentials and the associated conflicts of interest. As demonstrated by previous 
studies, the impacts of land use activities on hydrological processes are hard to quantify, being 
but ‘myths’ to justify certain policy agendas (Kiersch and Tognetti 2002). Thus I could note that 
the upstream-downstream contention was, among others, an instance of upstream inhabitants’ 
free-riding in the absence of clear rules and norms that set boundaries to resource access and use, 
something very much discussed among CPR theorists (Agrawal 2003; Ostrom 1990, 1999; 
Poteete and Ostrom 2003).  
                                                          
10 In this specific case, this means that they have no formal land tenure rights.  
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In the upstream area, the absence of a functioning public water service, with clear monitoring 
rules allowed inhabitants to withdraw water directly from the source without paying; sewage or 
waste management systems were also absent in rural areas. Not to talk about proper educational 
or health care facilities. It seemed that the state was irrefutably absent from this landscape:  
…the projects don’t reach us…they built some septic pits, but only for the people living close to 
the road. We’re isolated and they always leave us out. No one with real power to change our 
situation visits us to see how we live…we don’t need the multinationals’ money, we need a better 
life…we need that the state fulfils its promises. The words…they bore us… (URP14) 
In another instance, I found that upstream farmers were constantly invading territories belonging 
to publicly ‘protected’ or private conservation areas for cattle ranching activities, taking 
advantage of the lack of stringent monitoring mechanisms on these lands.  
Ever since 2000 various institutions and organizations (Cortolima, the (private) water users 
association - Usocoello, the NGO Semillas de Agua) have bought upstream land (in paramo and 
neighbouring areas) from local inhabitants (usually large-holders) for conservation purposes. 
However, these lands lacked a management plan (e.g. no rangers) and with the time, these actors 
lost interest in conserving the areas, since they could not bring short-term benefits (except for 
SA, which started investing in conservation areas in the late 2000) (IRP14). Moreover, slash and 
burn and deforestation for cattle ranching and logging activities continued in the neighbourhoods, 
causing disruptions in these ‘protected’ natural ecosystems.  
Thus, it seemed that not only did land acquisitions fail to enhance uplands conservation and link 
people with the environment (by preventing cattle ranching on conservation areas), but also 
promoted the perpetuation of unsustainable activities that continued to reflect the  “tragedy of 
open access”11), which holds that “if an individual does not make use of the resource, someone 
else will, and the opportunity for use will be lost” (Brogden and Greenberg 2008: 44), leading to 
a daunting scenario where land invasion leads to further environmental degradation.  
This is a clear illustration of a situation where inadequate or absent institutional arrangements 
and land strategies (mismanagement of private areas) expose biodiversity and water resources 
more than the ranching itself. It is not even the type of the property regime that matters for 
                                                          
11 This point of view is inspired by Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons”, but in this case it is aplied not on common 
property, but on areas whose use is not regulated and hence are called “open access areas” (Brogden and Greenberg 
2008: 45) 
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resource conservation, as many defenders of either market-based or public-based resource 
management would have claimed. We have seen that under private ownership, conservation 
areas in the watershed were still exposed to environmental degradation. Then, what matters is the 
extent to which a specific type of regime is accompanied by institutions and mechanism that can 
successfully regulate resource use behaviour (Ostrom 1990) because, in the absence of clear 
enforcement of rules, argued scholars, we witness a situation where “the user believes he or she 
must use the resource today for fear that either it will not be there in the future, or that future 
access to it will be cut off” (Leisz et al. 1995: 60-61).  
On a different level, the tensions described above also represent a narrative on smallholders’ 
economic and social marginalization (Bryant 1998; Paulson and Gezon 2008; Robbins 2012) as a 
consequence of privatization. In the late 1970s the state transferred to Usocoello the 
responsibility over the irrigation infrastructure in the watershed, without directly transferring 
water rights. While this positively impacted the performance and maintenance of the 
infrastructure – which was also a driver for increased rice productivity downstream (IRP 9-13)-, 
this isolated smallholders whose land was not big enough or who lacked resources to pay for 
irrigation works (URP 3-4; URP 11-13). Since the state betook itself from directly controlling 
the infrastructure and did not provide any subsidies for this category of farmers, they remained 
marginalized and in permanent competition with large rice producers.   
Thus, what we face here is more than yet another story about the role of resource proximity in 
generating tensions among watershed inhabitants. These two situations show us how individual 
behaviour and household decision-making power - a power in itself unevenly distributed in the 
watershed – is also shaped by forces that are independent of farmers, confirming our model that 
conflicts of interest, be they covert, like in this case, are not only driven by how actors interact 
with the water and land resources (first-level interactions) but also by institutions and structures 
that are either defective or encourage social and economic marginalization. 
5.2 Water and the clashes of the titans: agriculture and mining 
The following illustrates a case upon which political ecology has fervently insisted, where power 
plays a fundamental role in the ‘politicized environment’ and where some people become 
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socially and economically marginalized as a consequence of ‘damage’ or ‘scarcity’ produced by 
private interests and social and political elites (Bryant 1998; Robbins 2012).  
The watershed’s potential for agriculture is immense, especially in the fertile soils located 
downstream, which make this area the most important rice-producing region in the country. 
Moreover, the upstream part has been responsible for being the first supplier of arracacha in the 
country and one of the main regions for bean crops cultivation (Alcaldía de Cajamarca 2012; 
Cortolima 2006). However, while the agricultural sector has been confronted with inadequate 
farming practices, it has also been competing against the increasingly expanding mining 
activities (exploitations of dragging material and gold).  
86% of the upstream land (44.000 hectares) has already been leased to national and international 
mining companies (SIMCO 2012). One upstream farmer dauntingly declared: 
…we’re sold and we found out about this after three years… they didn’t ask. All this territory in 
the upper land is sold. The land here glitters, because of the gold… but the glitter is the worst 
thing that can happen to us… (URP12) 
In 2005, close to the upstream paramo areas, the state granted exploration concessions to a 
foreign multinational company for a project called ‘La Colosa’. Although environmental and 
socio-economic impact studies have already been conducted –as officials claimed-, watershed 
inhabitants repeatedly voiced concerns over the trustworthiness of these studies and the 
institutional incapacity at local and regional level to block this process. Through recent 
regulations, the regional environmental authority (Cortolima) stopped issuing water concessions 
in upstream degraded areas, for purposes that are not essential to sustain human life (IRP5; 
IRP6). However, other regulations state that it is the national government who is responsible for 
granting environmental licenses for national large infrastructure projects, which contradicts the 
previously mentioned regional policy. Since mining is viewed as an important driver of 
economic development, it is hard to believe that local interests would not be sacrificed at the 
expense of larger national economic and political interest.  
Upstream, midstream and downstream inhabitants have been equally concerned, since mining 
explorations through cyanide leaching techniques could not only threaten the water bodies, but 
also their main income-generating agricultural activities (URP 1-14; MRP 1-9; DRP 1-7). 
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Upstream in particular, this has created important social divisions, between low-income families 
who usually lack land titles (and thus their potential for agricultural activities is minimal) and see 
employment in mining as a ‘safety net’ for the household and the anti-mining families that can 
rely on agriculture or other income-generating activities (URP7).  
According to the National Development Plan, agriculture and mining are both pillars of 
economic development in the country (DNP 2011). Agriculture contributes with 10-15% to the 
country’s GDP and generates income for more than 3.7 million people (DANE 2011b; Ramírez-
Villegas et al. 2012).  Meanwhile, up until August 2011, 9.000 mining titles were delivered (4% 
of the country) and other 20.000 were pending applications (20% of the total country area)12.  
Thus the tension between farmers and miners is part of a larger story that goes beyond the 
borders of the watershed. As previous studies held, international multi-national markets and 
corporations decide independently of the local ecologies and can also exercise pressures on states 
(Brogden and Greenberg 2008). The situation described above clearly illustrates the “degradation 
and marginalization” thesis of political ecology, which postulates that environmental degradation 
is not only a result of unsustainable local practices, but also a result of a) the intervention of the 
state that decides the development pathway (in this case, investments in mining); b) the 
alignment to global economic demands, that implies that production systems “undergo transition 
to overexploitation of natural resources”, under the “axes of money, influence and control” of 
political economy (Robbins 2012: 21, 13); and of c) economic marginalization of people 
(Robbins 2012: 159), which makes them resort to mining activities as ‘safety nets’ for a living. 
Thus, the tensions between the sectors are, in fact, tensions between a ‘politicized environment’ 
and a powerless, marginalized, vulnerable people.  
5.3 Summary and implications of findings for RQ 1  
Drawing on the analytical model and its theoretical underpinnings, this segment of the study 
showed how interactions in the watershed manifested through silent, covert conflicts or 
contentions - between upstream and downstream inhabitants, small- and large-scale farmers and 
between economic sectors – have been defined by the resource structure, by the different actors’ 
                                                          
12 Out of these, 565 mining concessions have been granted in the Department of Tolima (414.043 ha), for 
exploitation of construction materials (301 titles, on around 47000 ha) and gold (221, on around 350.000 ha), 
followed by carbon and other minerals and metals (SIMCO 2012). 
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discourses of water, as well as by local/national policies related to water and land use and 
management. This effort also highlighted that upstream inhabitant’s relatively high decision-
maker power over water use – relative to downstream inhabitants – does not operate in a vacuum 
and is itself enabled by a higher-level political legitimate power (authority) that is not fully 
exploited. This is an appealing finding, since political ecology, while recognizing that power 
levels have not the same weight across social groups and that any relation is political (Robbins 
2012), apparently fell short in analysing the implications of the absenteeism of political power on 
local power dynamics and consequently on environmental degradation.  
6 Benefit-sharing mechanisms: a novel paradigm for the Coello 
watershed? 
Drawing on new institutionalism thinking, this section attempts to answer RQ2 and to elucidate 
how the BSMs as new institutional arrangements were developed, what the new rules are (Sub-
section 6.1), as well as what motivated stakeholders to support this new set-up (Sub-section 6.2). 
6.1 Overview of the BSMs in the Coello watershed 
Invoking different schemes for watershed management in the Andean region, scholars have 
referred to benefit-sharing mechanisms (BSMs) as  
…those agreements among watershed actors which aim to convert situations of uneven ES 
[ecosystem services] gains into opportunities to improve the distribution of benefits to all 
stakeholders, with a view to improving equity and providing incentives for the long-term 
protection of ES… (Quintero et al 2011)  
In the Coello watershed, BSMs were designed as a response to the threats to upstream 
ecosystems and headwaters, manifested through: unsystematic and uncoordinated private and 
public acquisitions of upper lands; the absence of Management Plans for these acquisitions and 
associated human invasions for animal farming (Table 1, p.33).  
Strictly speaking, the BSMs analysed in this study refer to three different agreements signed 
between the regional environmental authority (Cortolima), the water users association 
(Usocoello), the Departmental Secretariat for Agriculture and Rural Development (DSARD), the 
Municipality of Cajamarca (MoC) and Semillas de Agua (SA) in order to protect and conserve 
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uplands territory and thus ensure water quality and quantity to users. Protected areas, argued 
scholars, are key for conserving tropical biodiversity and water flow (Laurence et al. 2012).  
Accordingly, owners of the targeted areas would have to move out. However, contrary to 
discussions in political ecology (Robbins 2012), this is not a problem here, since these territories 
are inhabited by wealthy farmers. This does not say that political ecology is wrong by saying that 
declaration of protected areas creates further social and economic marginalization by displacing 
groups of people, but this does not occur in our case. In fact, the problem mentioned by SA 
representatives in repetitive discussions was not farmers’ willingness to sell these areas, but the 
unreasonable price asked for. However, the ones who are most likely to be affected by this 
measure are the small-scale cattle farmers who have been invading the protected areas, who lack 
ownership of any land and are now presented with no alternative for giving up the unsustainable 
agricultural activities (IRP14).  The BSMs refer to:  
BSM 1: A cooperation scheme between MoC and upstream communities for the 
implementation of a management plan for the Municipal Natural Park (MNP) La Bolivar. 
Figure 3 illustrates the location of the Park in the watershed.  
 
 Figure 3: Location of the Municipal Park 'La Bolivar' in the watershed 
Source: Alcaldía de Cajamarca and Semillas de Agua (2011:35) 
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BSM 2: A cooperation scheme between Cortolima, MoC and DSARD for the expansion and 
transformation of the MNP La Bolivar into a Regional Park, in order to increase the degree 
of protection against human encroachment and the further development of mining activities (the 
mining Project ‘La Colosa’). Figure 4 illustrates the location of the park relative to the land 
leased for mining exploration. 
 
BSM3: A co-management scheme between USOCOELLO and Semillas de Agua to protect 
3.400 hectares of paramo area in the watershed. 
Below, the BSMs are explained into detail: 
BSM 1: A joint management plan for the Municipal Natural Park (MNP) ‘La Bolivar’ 
Rationale To protect the Park from human 
encroachment and prevent the 
expansion of mining activities in the 
area. 
The Park was declared a protected area 
in 2006 but has lacked proper 
monitoring and management ever since. 
  
BSM 
1 
The implementation of a management plan 
for the park, which should be the joint 
responsibility of Moc and communities.  
Communities would be involved in the 
environmental and social characterization of 
the region: identification and classification 
of water resources, flora, fauna, soils, 
household information, etc.  
 
Figure 4: Location of the mining project ‘La Colosa’ (left) relative to the Municipal Park (right) 
Source: Alcaldía de Cajamarca and Semillas de Agua (2011:6) 
 
Table 1: BSMs in the Coello watershed 
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These agreements were part of a larger process facilitated by a partnership between international 
and national actors13, via a community-based development project. The project was funded by 
the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) and developed between 
2011 and 2013. It specifically targeted the creation of BSMs as a means to address unsolved 
conflicts in the watershed. Appendix D elaborates more on the methodology developed for this 
specific context but it suffices to say here that watershed stakeholders – from community 
representatives, to public and private actors and civil society - have been actively engaged 
                                                          
13 The Project, “Benefit-sharing mechanisms to enhance water productivity and reduce water-related conflicts in 
the Coello watershed” has been developed over three years (2011-2013).  It has been implemented by the World 
Wildlife Fund Colombia (WWF), the Stockholm Environmental Institute (SEI), the Kings College London (KCL), 
the National University of Colombia and Semillas de Agua (SA). 
The Park is home to important 
headwaters for the region. It is also 
located at 1 km distance from the land 
leased for the mining explorations 
project ‘La Colosa’ 
 
The clear definition of the activities and 
division of responsibilities is in progress. 
BSM 2: Extension and reclassification of the MNP into a Regional Natural Park (RNP) 
Rationale The current classification of the park 
still allows for free-riding and does not 
ensure enough protection against the 
menace coming from the possible future 
mining activities.  
Areas in the immediate vicinity are 
dedicated to extensive cattle farming, 
hunting and slash and burn practices, 
which many times extend into the park. 
BSM 
2 
The expansion of the park area via 
acquisitions of land made by Cortolima, the 
MoC and the DSARD on the basis of Law 
99/1993 (Art.111) 
The integration of these areas into the park 
and the reclassification of this (around 1300 
ha) as a Regional Natural Park.   
BSM 3: Co-management of paramo areas in the watershed  
Rationale SA and Usocoello have individually 
bought land in the paramo but the lack 
of an integrated management approach 
encouraged cattle farming in the area 
and in the neighbourhood. 
The area of paramo is of hydrological 
and biodiversity richness. It provides an 
estimated value of more than 74 million 
m³ of water per year in the entire 
watershed (SA 2003) 
BSM 
3 
To integrate the territories owned by SA 
(around 3000 ha) and Usocoello (around 
400 ha) into a single private conservation 
area in order to form a biological corridor 
for water and biodiversity protection. 
This includes participatory (landscape) 
environmental characterization, land 
zoning, joint planning of conservation 
activities as well as of monitoring 
mechanisms (rangers). 
Source: The author 
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throughout the entire process, from identifying the main water pressures and conflicts to 
providing solutions to these problems.  
Consequently, the BSMs were proposed and negotiated during an open-space meeting in 
September 2012.  The monitoring of these mechanisms, as much desired by CPR theorists, is in 
the hands of the Watershed Monitoring Committee, which consists of 15 upstream, downstream, 
and midstream community and civil society representatives. Monitoring activities include regular 
meetings with BSMs stakeholders in order to ensure continuous compliance, the management 
and coordination of the rangers for the protected areas that fall under these BSMs, but also 
possible future watershed projects that aim at integrating environmental management with 
human and economic development in the region (IRP14).  
While the implementers of the project have been in charge of facilitating stakeholders meetings, 
trainings and capacity building, the local partner, SA, was directly engaged in the BSMs.  
6.2 Protecting upstream territory: why bother?  
CPR scholarship already made invaluable contributions to collective action theory, tackling the 
drivers of people’s willingness to cooperate and trying to draw general principles of collective 
action (See Section 3.3 and Appendix D). Hereby my aim is not to test the validity of these 
findings, but to identify the contextual factors (and interests) that led to the creation of these 
BSMs, in order to better understand actors’ behaviour within the new arrangement.  
As mentioned earlier, watershed inhabitants and representatives from the public and private 
sector were brought together under the framework of a development project. Since this research 
does not attempt to evaluate the project, the attention will be then directed to assessing people’s 
motivation for designing these specific BSMs but not for participating in the project activities.  
It has been assumed that a shared understanding of benefits is more likely to level the dialogue 
between stakeholders and solve water conflicts. Moreover, scholars say, where benefits are 
demonstrable and their distribution accepted by all, cooperation and engagement in further 
conservation activities is more likely (Kerr 2007; Kiersch and Tognetti 2002; Mapezda et al. 
2010; Tarrow 1994).  
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Hydrological modelling and analysis in the region has shown that the expansion, declaration and 
reforestation of protected areas in the upper part would increase hydrological regulation in the 
long run and would provide favourable conditions for the development of vegetative cover (with 
at least 85%) and the reduction of soil erosion rates (with at least 5%). This in turn, would 
enhance sedimentation in the watershed and create better conditions for sustainable agricultural 
activities but also for human living (Mulligan and Rubiano 2012).  
Yet conservation areas do not provide direct benefits to watershed inhabitants. Hydrological flow 
(water quality or quantity) is either regulated in time or just protected against human 
encroachment and other interventions in the landscapes. Many downstream respondents were 
aware that upstream conservation would not automatically mean more or better water in the 
lower areas (DRP 1-4).  
The BSMs do not provide any monetary benefits either, since these schemes do not involve any 
kind of compensation for upstream watershed inhabitants, especially those living in paramo areas 
(URP 4-10). Therefore, it is important to look at other type of benefits and costs that cannot be 
monetized but are important to humans (White et al. 2011).   
Based on the transcribed and segmented interview data14, I found various factors related to the 
individual choice to cooperate or to defect, based on participants’ perceptions. While this 
exercise has not the strength and precision of a trust game, since semi-structured interviews are 
also flawed by authors’ personal interpretation of words and gestures (Bryman 2008), this can 
offer the reader a better understanding of why the BSMs emerged in the watershed.  
Most of the watershed actors – and upstream inhabitants in particular - saw in the BSMs an 
efficient, legitimate instrument to block the expansion of mining activities in the upstream area 
by creating the biological corridor (URP 1-14; MRP 1-9; DRP 1-7; IRP 9-17). Others who have 
been actively engaged in environmental groups and aware of the problems in the entire 
watershed suggested a general concern for the environment and its resources (URP 1-4; URP6; 
MRP 1-4; DRP 1-5). This was also the stance of public authorities who sought to justify their 
actions and investments in the watershed (e.g. reforestation) through this concern (IRP 1-14).  
                                                          
14 The data refers to interviews carried out with all stakeholder groups, both the ones who were engaged in the BSM 
design process and the ones who weren’t.  
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Concern for neighbouring communities’ water supply situation was hardly mentioned and was 
mostly expressed by the ones who have been active in different environmental groups (URP 1,2; 
URP6; MRP 7,8; DRP 1,4). However, this indicated that inter-community linkages and solidarity 
are still lacking and therefore inhabitants’ readiness to cooperate cannot be explained by the trust 
they have in one another or in the local/regional authorities, a precondition for co-operation that 
was signalled several times in the literature (Cardenas et al. 2009; Ostrom 1996).  
… the state created a culture of individualism… it taught us to leave in fear and suspicion… to 
mistrust the other, because, you know, he may rob us, put an arm to our head, take over our 
village and take over our land… we don’t come together, our sense of belonging is missing… 
we’ve been displaced, so how can we trust? We cannot value our nearest, a human being, so how 
can we value a thing… water? We need to start valuing our people and then we can think about 
the rest… (URP1) 
The ones who did not take part in the BSM felt excluded either due to their geographical 
isolation (these respondents lived in remote rural areas, either upstream or downstream), or due 
to a larger process of socio-economic marginalization encouraged by national and local politics. 
Therefore, they referred to the BSMs as “another chatter” (URP7), “a way of spending valuable 
money” (URP9), since they could not view the practical, immediate benefits from upland 
protection on their farms:  
…we need some subsidies for milk production… or something that could make the crops more 
resilient to pests and that would not require the use of so much fertilizers…or see, we have no 
sanitation facility in here, they should better start with this…we have more urgent needs… 
(URP8) 
 
However, even if benefits are non-monetary, but perceived differently by watershed 
stakeholders, contrary to previous findings, they seem to provide strong enough incentives for 
cooperation (Sadoff and Grey 2002). 
 
6.3 Summary and implications of findings for RQ2 
Findings for RQ2 revealed that the BSMs in the watershed were intended to change the previous 
watershed management paradigm by focusing on the protection of upland territories and by 
engaging more actors into the dialogue. What brought them together was a close-to unanimous 
interest to block the expansion of mining activities in the upper areas. However, the absence of 
incentives to shift to sustainable agricultural practices and abandon the invaded lands will cost 
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farmers and will more likely crate further social and economic marginalization, as political 
ecologists fear (Paulson and Gezon 2008; Robbins 2012). On the other hand, derived non-
monetary benefits are highly dependent on actors’ commitments to respect these agreements and 
the ability of the Monitoring Committee to hold actors accountable. This comes in agreement 
with previous scholarship that argued that one of the preconditions for the functioning of 
community-based institutions is the presence of a functioning local monitoring mechanism that 
oversees actors’ behaviour (Agrawal 2001; Ostrom 1990, 1999, 2000, 2007). 
 
7 New landscapes of power?  
 
This section refers to the last part of our analytical model (Section 3.4), the period after the 
design of the BSMs. It aims to answer RQ3, exploring the implications that BSMs have over 
power relations in the watershed and the extent to which this has been likely to dilute water-
related conflicts. In line with the analytical model, different levels of stakeholder interactions and 
types of power will be tackled, departing from the hypothesis that BSMs were created to 
generate cooperative interactions at different levels, which, in its turn, would potentially solve 
water conflicts (Candelo et al. 2008; Escobar and Estrada 2011, White et al., 2011). While a new 
institutionalism lens helps us look at the effects of stakeholder processes and identify the 
preconditions for successful, ‘robust institutions’ (Ostrom 1990), political ecology scholarship 
will guide the analysis of shifts in power and consequences on actors’ interactions, recognizing 
that power, while omnipresent in society, is constantly contested and negotiated (Bryant 1998; 
Kerr 2007; Paulson and Gezon 2008; Peet and Watts 2004; Robbins 2012). 
The BSMs were envisioned as a form of integrated upstream watershed management, engaging 
meaningful stakeholders, from the ones who have the highest decision-making power 
(Cortolima, MoC, DSARD) to the ones who have most water needs for irrigation (Usocoello) 
and the organization that best represents the environmental interests (SA), and ultimately 
watershed community representatives. I argue that these new arrangements and the manner in 
which they were designed – as a multi-stakeholder process – facilitated not only dialogue, but 
also negotiation and transfer of power, between state institutions and between watershed 
inhabitants and the watershed institutions, thus reorganizing the power landscape in the 
watershed.   
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7.1 Pockets of hope, pockets of power: beyond community engagement  
Participatory institutional arrangements have been of great concern among CPR and broader 
NRM scholarship. More recent studies showed that multi-stakeholder processes are more likely 
to “democratize watershed management, to manage conflict” since they engage multiple voices 
and act like “vehicles for democratization and emancipation” (Warner 2012: 1, 6). As White et 
al. (2011: 4) argued,  
…for society to increase and share benefits from water resources, a process is needed. Existing 
rules and customs (institutions) on water ownership and use are not only the pathway for change 
but are also a target for change. By ensuring that voices are heard, change is more likely… 
Identifying effective ways to communicate and share perspectives is essential.  
In the Coello watershed, community representatives were engaged in the BSMs-process from the 
very beginning; they identified the threats, needs and the possible options to solve water-related 
problems (See Appendix B). Site-specific research with communities, observed scholars, helps 
identify and agree upon the causes of water problems but also increase the likelihood to 
influence local policies on watershed management (e.g. reforestation, water quality testing, etc.) 
(Kiersch and Tognetti 2002).  
Then community representatives negotiated the proposed mechanisms with relevant stakeholders 
in an open-space forum. Finally, they became the watchdogs of these mechanisms, by forming 
the Monitoring Committee. Thus they turned from more or less powerful free-riders to powerful 
supervisors, empowered to hold institutions accountable. This very idea of a functioning, low-
cost local monitoring mechanism is what Elinor Ostrom (1990) saw as a fundamental 
precondition for ‘robust institutions’ to manage CPRs.   
Discussions with community representatives (URP 1-4, 6, 14; MRP 2-4, 7, 8; DRP 1-6) revealed 
that this new position of the community was mostly driven by the knowledge gained throughout 
the process, an aspect the literature considered essential for meaningful participation. (Berkes 
2009):  
…in the past, they [Cortolima, Municipality, Usocoello) didn’t look at us because we didn’t know 
who’s responsible for what, we didn’t know the law. But now we do and therefore we can speak 
with the same language as they do and depart in the negotiations on equal footing… (URP14). 
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The devolution of some of the watershed management power to the communities also had 
broader effects on how citizens relate to watershed institutions that threaten their livelihoods 
through their policies, thus giving birth to a new form of civil disobedience. During a group 
discussion with upstream inhabitants, participants talked about how they once stopped the miners 
from entering their village and from campaigning for the planned exploitation activities. This 
scenario could hardly be seen previously, when inhabitants were mere spectators of powerful 
elites taking over their land and water resources:   
…one day they wanted to organize a celebration for the Family’s Day here…every participant 
had to bring minimum four members of the family…they had the Municipality’s approval and we 
were supposed to sign something. But how can we sign to sell our own land?...because we knew 
what their real intentions were… they thought we are illiterates! So we all went out of the houses 
that day, patrolling our village and making sure nobody enters it – with bats, shouting, 
whatever…now they can only enter if they camouflage themselves…we have the right to decide 
what’s good for ourselves (URP14) 
It is inopportune to judge whether this would solve the mining problem and thus address the 
inter-sectoral tensions identified in Section 5. Experience has shown that mining concessions in 
protected areas are not a novelty for the country. But instead of making fortuitous predictions, 
what we can do is further reflect upon the potential and behaviour that exists in local people to 
continue opposing these activities, and how this was driven not only by an institutional change 
process, but also by a shift in power relations, by a somewhat stronger voice given to the local 
inhabitants. Rather than only showing how political and economic interests determine local 
strategies and environmental pressures, the above redraws a picture of how local communities 
are able to adapt and innovate within this system, their ability to respond to external forces and 
change their behaviour by rethinking watershed management, without top-down support, but 
disobeying state policy in their “daily acts of resistance” (Robbins 2012: 158).  
Meanwhile, however, farmers’ problems have not altered and tensions between social groups 
still exist. In fact, as noted earlier, the BSMs designed do not have any direct effect on farmers’ 
well-being, since no means for incentivizing sustainable agricultural practices or alternative 
income generation have been provided. On the field, contamination with fertilizers, agriculture 
on hillsides is still happening, and the BSMs did not change this. They did not create more 
responsible citizens, but citizens more ready to ‘responsibilize’, to hold authorities accountable.  
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This is not necessarily wrong, if this situation would not bring into question aspects of 
equitability and power distribution at lower levels. Who are the citizens with watchdog power? 
Inhabitants who participated in the BSMs-development process gained valuable non-monetary 
benefits, from empowerment, to knowledge and trust (URP 1-4, 6, 14; MRP 2-4, 7, 8; DRP 1-6). 
But meanwhile many were left out and thus did not gain anything in the short and medium-term. 
Thus, apart from shifting state power to the communities, BSMs did create further social pockets 
of power within the communities, but pockets filled with the power of information, of 
knowledge. According to previous studies, this may have serious impacts on empowerment and 
future cooperation (Swallow et al. 2006). However, I argue, this impact also depends on the 
representativeness of the community members participating in the BSMs, but also on their ability 
to multiply the information they have among their neighbours. Yet these suppositions go beyond 
the scope of this study but would constitute a fruitful topic for further investigation. 
 
7.2 The clash of the titans revisited? 
The previous sub-section revealed that the engagement of communities in developing the BSMs 
had an important impact on the power dynamics in the watershed and that this empowerment 
created spill-over effects on a different type of behaviour, such as civil, legitimate disobedience. 
Undoubtedly, this created a base for “a new form of democracy of watershed management” 
(Warner 2012: 8). But, as there are more powerful decision-makers that dictate how resources 
are used and managed in the watershed, community voice is not enough. 
The new institutional arrangement spreads the power to control and manage the upstream areas 
between various actors, shifting the traditional management approach to co-management. 
Upstream lands are no longer under the control of actors that take individual and uncoordinated 
decisions. Power is then diffused across different centres and scales: between civil society (SA), 
private sector (Usocoello) and the state (through Cortolima, SRADR and MoC). Vincent Ostrom 
et al. argued that polycentric institutions, where decision-making is diffused across different 
centres and scales prevent elite capture and create management coherence (Ostrom et al., 1961). 
In this case, it should allow for more coherent and coordinated responses to environmental 
threats that stem from human interventions and would also reduce transaction costs by pooling 
resources together for conservation activities.  
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From the part of the communities, the BSMs were a medium to bring meaningful actors together 
and enable a framework where their responsibilities are actually exercised. Cortolima is therefore 
now called to invest in activities that go beyond environmental campaigns (such as buying and 
managing upstream territories), thus exploiting its full decision-making power potential as the 
highest environmental authority at watershed level. Usocoello is called for investing in 
environmental activities that cross the border of downstream territories. For instance, a big part 
of its budget for 2013 was planned for land purchases in the paramo area under the co-
management agreement – but also in general watershed management, via education campaigns 
and reforestation activities in affected bank areas, for conservation and protection purposes (IRP 
9-12). And finally, the DSARD is now ushered to abide by the law and invest part of its budget 
in conservation activities (IRP7), thus making sure that there is coherence between investments 
in agriculture and the environment.   
…before, if you were asking what authorities do to protect our water resources, their answers 
were clear-cut: “we buy land and we plant trees, a lot of trees”. I think now they got it – they got 
it that we need to reach out in a different manner… (JIRP14) 
Thus, by designing a scheme for power-sharing, benefit-sharing mechanisms were turned into 
responsibility-sharing mechanisms. 
As CPRs scholars noted, information is a precondition of cooperation in CPR (Agrawal 2003; 
Kerr 2007; Ostrom 1990, 1999, 2000; Poteete and Ostrom 2003). In our case, the change in 
institutional behaviour was in large part facilitated by knowledge sharing and information 
exchange and the trust building-process associated with it and produced during the entire 
collective action process. The preparation phase of the BSMs (Appendix D) gave watershed 
stakeholders the opportunity to learn about current water availability and quality (via 
socialization of hydrological modelling results), watershed pressures (via participatory problem 
mapping) but also about current institutional arrangements responsible for watershed governance 
and management:  
…the entire process made us familiar not only with the others’ problems, but also with the 
institutional challenges we face. Water resources are of poor quality and sometimes scarce for 
both small and large scale farmers. Meanwhile, we have been closed behind a wall where we 
were unaware of how each of us is working... (IRP3).  
Such benefits from knowledge sharing have also been vowed by political ecology scholars, who 
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argued that when stakeholders have the opportunity to engage in sharing knowledge and 
expressing interests and the incentives they expect in order to cooperate, they start visualizing a 
bigger picture of the problems and of the solutions to them. Having laid their interests on the 
table and understanding how diverging interests can intersect, they will be more willing to 
engage in managing complex landscapes and problems (Bogden and Greenberg 2008: 52).  
However, the success of multi-stakeholder processes lays not so much on the distribution of 
voices, as in engaging the actors who have real power to change, to reach the policy agenda and 
influence it (Brogden and Greenberg 2008).   
That the state’s voice (through Cortolima and MoC) has been present in the design and 
implementation of the BSMs is an obvious fact. However, I argue that when environment is 
politicized it is very hard to achieve cooperation and prevent ‘environmental conflicts’ from re-
occurring (Robbins 2012). And this is a hindrance to the effectiveness of BSMs on the long run.  
Interviewing upstream public officials I found counsellors supportive of the BSMs and very 
engaged in community-based environmental work, leading educational campaigns and assisting 
farmers with technical advisory (on sustainable small-scale irrigation, organic farming, basic 
sanitation, etc.). Others were engaged in helping building a communal green house with organic 
tubes and vegetables seeds that were then given away to the poorest rural farmers, who were then 
monitored if they properly manage and ultimately harvest the yield. They were not necessarily 
highly-educated employees, but they were engaged in the entire BSM process and were aware of 
the challenges in all parts in the watershed (IRP 2-4).  
Two doors further, where the rank of the officials was higher and the stake of keeping the 
position bigger, I was presented a totally different discourse, based on state-led neo-liberalist 
principles:  
...there is no poverty in here, there is lack of mentality. People are uneducated, they dump waste 
all over, deforest, invade private and public spaces with their animals…we need to do something 
about the expansion of the agricultural frontier, which has become a menace to the environment. 
And we plan to do it…to take action…mining could be an opportunity. If the state says it’s 
sustainable, that is lawful, than it is. We abide, because we respect the law, we respect the 
Constitution…(IRP1) 
But contextualizing it, such a situation is not different from what we observed in Section 5, from 
the contradiction in strategies and policies when it comes to economic development via 
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agriculture or via extractive industry. This time, however, this contradiction alienates members 
of the same institution, creates an internal cleavage and illustrates what Watts calls “the rupture 
of local systems as they become part of coherent and highly integrated global [in this case 
national] networks”, when talking about the effects of the global social and economic transition 
on the food crisis in the Sahel (Watts 1983: 14). It confirms what previous literature has already 
found - that disputes between ideologies do not occur only between communities, or between 
communities and state and private actors, but also in local political arenas (Brogden and 
Greenberg 2008: 45).  
Thus, this situation illustrates very well the continuation of the situation prior to the design of 
BSMs, where authorities respond cannot economic pressures and elite interests in the regulation 
of extraction activities (in this case, gold mining). Although the state produces a lot of laws in 
favour of environmental conservation, they are foggy, flexible enough, offering space for 
infringement and for exercising (illegitimate) political power (IRP 14-17).  
7.3 Summary and implications of findings for RQ3  
The findings for RQ3 elucidate how power is not only present in all social relations, but also 
negotiated and transferred among actors at different levels (Paulson and Gezon 2008), 
confirming the validity of the analytical model. They illustrated that overall the BSMs can not 
only be beneficial for biodiversity, but also create new dynamics between actors and their 
relative power. This was mostly related to how power landscapes were thought to be reshaped 
with the BSMs, but less with the institutional arrangements per se, since they hardly directly 
benefit water users.  
Meanwhile, upstream-downstream and small- and large-scale farmers’ tensions remain 
unaddressed – and created additional pockets of power in the communities. Moreover, even if 
BSMs were a medium for community empowerment and power devolution, they did not manage 
to address local-national cleavages, and the way state power can influence local politics and 
business. Gaining upstream municipality’ definite support for opposing mining activities and 
promoting agricultural development in the region is something the BSMs have yet to achieve. 
This indicates a situation where the power of national politics remained unbridled, confirming 
political ecologists’ concern that, in the end, “states do not like sharing power much” (Warner 
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2012: 12). This also leads us back to the analytical model, which hypothesizes that power, scale 
and the broader political and economic context influence actions and interactions in a watershed 
context and therefore, locally devised rules are not sufficient enough to guarantee sustainability 
of social relations if the powerful decision-makers remain isolated from the process.  
 
8 Concluding remarks 
This study argues that current problems related to water in complex watershed landscapes 
require new management approaches that nurture collaboration and knowledge sharing between 
contentious stakeholders.  
From an extensive analysis of the Coello watershed, we could see that, as agreements per se, 
BSMs can hardly solve power relations in the entire landscape and therefore are far from being a 
straightforward solution to water conflicts.  
On one hand, regardless of its specific objective, benefit-sharing always creates winners and 
losers, and it can do so in a more subtle and less intuitive way. BSMs can have interesting effects 
on the ones who sign the agreements, and who decide to cede power in favour of a more 
collaborative decision-making and management efforts. Yet this reconfiguration of power is 
highly dependent on actors’ commitments and only holds for those integrated in the process.  
On the other hand, benefit-sharing can sometimes be an elusive concept, since monetary benefits 
are inexistent and non-monetary ones are camouflaged and difficult to perceive. BSMs then 
become just a pretext for creating other institutional arrangements, with the hope but without the 
assurance that everyone will derive gains in an equitable manner.  
Therefore, I argue that the real potential to change behaviour, power dynamics and solve 
conflicts rests in the approach of any benefit-sharing arrangement, more than in the agreement 
per se. Such an approach refers to a polycentric institutional arrangement, where poles of power 
are spread among different actor groups in the watershed, including community representatives. 
Because an agreement per se cannot address all the problems in the watershed, changing the 
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dynamics of power via a more flexible, adaptable arrangement could later have a spill-over effect 
over the solution of more specific problems.  
The different manifestations of power and interests identified in this study reveal that, in general, 
responses to water-related challenges are by far simplistic and purely technical. As revealed by 
the case study, institutional freeze and/or malfunctioning can not only be a hindrance to 
sustainable watershed management but can also create social and economic marginalization that 
leads to further pressures on the environment. Since “difficult environmental problems may 
require innovative political approaches that rest on models of cooperation rather than 
competition” (Gezon and Paulson 2008: 3),  answers must reconcile divergent interests that go 
beyond the local level and don’t necessarily refer to how humans relate to the resource, but how 
institutions themselves connect to environmental problems. Politics of local development and 
watershed, I argue, must be better anchored in broader national agendas.  
Moreover, answers must reflect the idea that power is not necessarily a bad thing if legitimate 
and that decision-making power is actually essential in order to organize human actions and 
interactions. The problem is not that it is assumed, but the absence of it and the way it is 
distributed among different poles of power within new institutional arrangements. As revealed 
by the case study, community empowerment via knowledge and voice in decision-making is one 
step towards taking cognizance of the importance of holding powerful actors accountable and 
not necessarily taking their power away.  
I conclude by arguing that future studies should seize on two opportunities. First - to explore the 
robustness of these arrangements in time, drawing on CPR scholarship, since such a topic was 
not appropriate for our context, given the infancy of the BSMs. Second - to focus more on the 
interplay between humans, institutions, nature and power when analysing CPR landscapes. The 
marriage between political ecology and new institutionalism can be fruitful and propitious. This 
is not to say that a focus on the resource (be it land or water) is inopportune or wrong. On the 
contrary, it is a point of departure. But resources move and are exhaustible, while institutions and 
social relations can resist in time, if conditions for their robustness are met (Ostrom 1990). So 
our opportunity now is to invest in what can be durable in order to be able to sustain what is 
perennial.   
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Appendix  
Appendix A: Watershed Management in Coello, Colombia  
   
  
             
Source: Compilation from own field data and Blanco (2008) 
Ministry of the Environment and 
Sustainable Development 
Regional Environmental Authority 
(Cortolima) 
• Formulates the national environmental policies;  
• Establishes environmental regulation;  
• Establishes charges fees; 
• Administers national protected areas; 
• Grants environmental licenses to large infrastructure projects. 
Municipalities 
• Guarantee safe drinking water to 
watershed inhabitants, via  and sanitation 
• In charge of the distribution, discharge of 
water, as well as of treating residual water 
• Administers irrigation infrastructure  
• Invests in conservation activities, via 
reforestation and acquisition of upland 
territories 
• Pays to Cortolima an annual water fee, money 
which is then invested in land acquisitions in 
upper areas of the watershed 
• In the watershed, they are responsible mainly 
for large-scale irrigation infrastructure 
Households 
Water users association (Usocoello) 
Other users Farmers 
In some cases (mainly excepting 
upstream rural areas, many of 
whom don’t pay any water fee) 
there are watershed committees 
in charge of how water is used 
(including infrastructure 
maintenance) 
Any person/entity can submit a 
request to Cortolima, which 
evaluates the request on the 
basis of resource availability 
and impacts on other water 
users 
In order to get access to 
irrigation infrastructure, farmers 
apply to Usocoello (meeting 
certain technical criteria – land 
surface, type of cultivar, soil 
condition, etc.) 
• Formulates the national environmental policies;  
• Establishes environmental regulation;  
• Establishes charges fees; 
• Administers national protected areas; 
• Grants environmental licenses to large infrastructure 
projects. 
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Appendix B: Forms of social power: a selection* 
 
Category Type of power 
Governmental • Legislative power to make the rules governing the acquisition, distribution 
and use of social power 
• Police power to enforce laws or the interests of power-holders 
• Judicial power to make judgments about the use and balance of social 
power  
• Regulatory power to supervise economic and political activities 
• Bureaucratic power to enable or resist the implementation of policies  
Political • Organizational power to coordinate the actions of many people  
• Propaganda power to influence public opinion, motivation and experience 
of reality  
Economic • Industrial or productive power to control production, resources and labor 
• Financial power to buy or control things with money or credit 
• Market power to influence consumption, production, prices, wages or other 
market conditions 
Cultural and 
institutional 
 
• Social institutions and traditions define the context in which power is 
exercised  
• Laws and constitutions define the limits and channels of power 
• Ideas provide a focus around which to mobilize people, and a direction to 
go 
• Public opinion constitutes the extent of popular support or opposition 
Knowledge 
 
• Knowledge to comprehend circumstances, to predict and plan, and to create 
effects - particularly by knowing how to use other forms of power  
  
Personal 
• Leadership to motivate and coordinate other people 
• Persuasion to mobilize people's awareness and opinions 
• Intelligence to comprehend meaning and solve problems 
• Technical skill to manipulate physical resources and barriers 
• Strategic and tactical skill to create and utilize situations to best advantage  
Physical • Physical force to coerce the behavior of others’  
 
 
 
 
* Wording belongs entirely to Atlee and Atlee (2008) 
 
Source: Compilation by Atlee and Atlee (2008) 
 
    
A. Nowak: Pockets of Hope, Pockets of Power| 54 
Appendix C: Conditions for the emergence of locally-devised institutions to manage CPRs 
 
The selection and wording belongs to Kerr (2007: 96-97) and is based on the work of Agrawal 
(2003); Baland and Plateau (1996); Ostrom (1990); Wade (1988) 
Category Condition 
Resource 
System 
 
 Small size  
 Well-demarcated boundaries  
 Low levels of mobility  
 Possibilities of storage of benefits from the resource  
 Predictability  
 Indicators of resource conditions are available at reasonable costs  
 Traceability of resource improvement to a particular intervention 
 Feasibility of improving the resource  
Group  Small size  
 Clear boundaries  
 Shared norms 
 Trust 
 Past successful/organizational experiences  
 Appropriate leadership  
 Interdependence among group members  
 Homogeneity of interests  
 Low poverty  
 Low discount rate  
Relationship 
between 
resource 
system and 
group 
 Overlap between user group residential location and resource location  
 High levels of dependence by group members on resource system  
 Demand growth and technical change are gradual enough to give emerging 
institutional arrangements time to establish 
Institutional 
arrangements 
 Ability to establish favorable institutional arrangements 
 
External 
environment 
 Autonomy  
 Availability of low cost adjudication  
 Low cost exclusion technology with respect to the external world  
 Supportive external sanctioning institutions  
 Appropriate levels of external aid to compensate local users for conservation 
activities 
 
Source: Kerr (2007: 96-97). Wording belong entirely to the source 
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Appendix D: Methodology for the implementation of the BSMs in Coello, Colombia 
  
 
Members of upstream, midstream and downstream 
communities put forward to watershed 
Municipalities, CORTOLIMA, USOCOELLO and 
Semillas de Agua a list of possible BSMs for 
negotiation. After an open dialogue 
between watershed actors,  BSMs 
agreements between communities and the other 
actors were signed. This was a public event held in 
September 2012.  
This stage involved a process of capacity strengthening of 
watershed actors in three different areas: 
- environmental management: analysis of the hydrological state of 
the watershed - water resource quality and quantity). This included 
training in modeling and interpretation of hydrological data 
- conflict resolution: participatory mapping of conflicts related to 
water and of actors key for effective negotiation of BSMs 
- civic participation: rights and legal instruments to effect these 
rights regarding watershed conservation and community well-
being  
Community representatives constitute a 
Monitoring Committee to make sure that the watershed 
actors comply with the commitments assumed when signing the 
agreements. The Committee establishes regular meetings with BSMs 
stakeholders to follow-up compliance with the agreements. 
Monitoring Committee is also responsible for designing a draft of the 
Management Plan for the upstream land acquisitions. 
1.Preparation 
2.Negotiation 
3.Monitoring 
Source: personal compilation from field data 
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Appendix E: Locating research participants (farmers) in the watershed 
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Appendix F: Research participants – farmers  
 
 
Code Name Location 
Village
* 
Gender 
(M/F) 
Age 
categ.
** 
Role  
Type of 
farmer
***  
Part 
of 
BSM 
Y/N 
Type of 
interview/
discussion
**** 
Date of the 
interview/ 
discussion 
1 URP1 Fernando  upstream II m 5 user S Y SSI 13.12.2012 
2 URP2 Nelson  upstream II m 4 user S Y SSI 27.01.2013 
3 URP3 Gustavo. upstream II m 1 user S Y SSI 26.01.2013 
4 URP4 Elson  upstream II m 2 user S Y SSI 27.01.2013 
5 URP5 Carmen  upstream V  f 4 user M  N SSI 24.03.2013 
6 URP6 Jose  upstream VIII  m 3 user S Y SSI 24.03.2013 
7 URP7 Jose  upstream VIII  m 4 user M  N SSI 19.03.2013 
8 URP8 Pascual  upstream V f 4 user M  N SSI 19.03.2013 
9 URP9 Julio  upstream I m 4 user L N SSI 24.03.2013 
10 URP10 Rolando  upstream I m 2 user S N GD1 29.01.2013 
11 URP11 Jesus  upstream I m 4 user M  N GD1 29.01.2013 
12 URP12 Olga  upstream I f 4 user S N GD1 29.01.2013 
13 URP13 Gustavo  upstream I m 4 user S N GD1 29.01.2013 
14 URP14 Eliana  upstream I f 3 user S Y GD1 29.01.2013 
15 MRP1 Cesar  midstream X  m 4 user S N SSI 21.03.2013 
16 MRP2 Amparo  midstream VII f 4 user S Y SSI 21.03.2013 
17 MRP3 Aurora  midstream VII f 4 user S Y SSI 19.03.2013 
18 MRP4 Maria  midstream IX f 3 user S Y SSI 21.03.2013 
19 MRP5 Oseas  midstream IX f 3 user S N SSI 21.03.2013 
20 MRP6 Jose  midstream X  m 4 user S N SSI 13.12.2012 
21 MRP7 Alicia  midstream VII f 4 user S Y SSI 20.03.2013 
22 MRP8 Alcira  midstream IX f 3 user M  Y SSI 20.03.2013 
23 MRP9 Luis  midstream III m 4 user M  N SSI 19.03.2013 
24 DRP1 Felipe  downstream IV m 2 user S Y GD2 22.03.2013 
25 DRP2 Jose  downstream III m 5 user S Y GD2 22.03.2013 
26 DRP3 Susan  downstream IV f 4 user S Y GD2 22.03.2013 
27 DRP4 Carlos  downstream IV m 5 user M  Y GD2 22.03.2013 
28 DRP5 Cesar  downstream VI m 4 user L Y SSI 20.03.2013 
29 DRP6 Nancy downstream IV f 4 user S Y SSI 13.12.2012 
30 DRP7 Marta  downstream VI f 3 user S N SSI 
  
(continued) 
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*Codes for villages 
 **Codes for 
age 
 *** Code for type 
of farmer 
 ****Code for type of 
interview/discussion 
Code Villages:  Location 
 Code Age 
category 
 Code Type of 
farmer 
 Code  Type 
I Anaime Upstream 
 1 18-29  S Small-scale  SSI Semi-structured 
interview 
II Cajamarca Upstream 
 2 30-39  M Medium-scale  GD1 Group-discussion 
1 
III Chaguala Downstream 
 3 40-49  L Large-scale  GD2 Group discussion 
2 
IV Coello Downstream 
 4 50-59     ID Informal 
discussion  
V El Aguila Upstream  5 60+       
VI El Espinal Downstream          
VII Ibague Midstream          
VIII La Bolivar  Upstream          
IX Llanitos Midstream          
X San Luis Midstream          
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Appendix G: Research participants – institutional representatives 
 
 
Location Code Name 
Gender 
(M/F) 
Age 
categ.
* 
Institution   
Part 
of 
BSM 
Y/N 
Type of 
interview/
discussion
** 
Date of the 
interview/di
scussion 
1 
upstream IRP1 Luis m 4 
Municipality of 
Cajamarca 
Y 
SI 23.03.2013 
2 
upstream IRP2 Juan  m 1 
Municipality of 
Cajamarca 
Y 
SI 29.01.2013 
3 
upstream IRP3 Sixto  m 3 
Municipality of 
Cajamarca 
Y 
SI 29.01.2013 
4 
upstream IRP4 Elias  m 4 
Municipality of 
Cajamarca 
Y 
SI 29.01.2013 
5 regional IRP5 Consuelo  f 4 Cortolima Y SI 28.01.2013 
6 regional IRP6 Fernando  m 3 Cortolima Y SI 28.01.2013 
7 regional IRP7 German  m 3 DSARD Y SI 28.01.2013 
8 downstream IRP9 Carlos. m 2 Usocoello N SI 22.03.2013 
9 downstream IRP10 Hernan  m 3 Usocoello Y SI 30.01.2013 
10 downstream IRP11 Manuel  m 3 Usocoello Y SI 30.01.2013 
11 downstream IRP12 David  m 2 Usocoello N SI 22.03.2013 
12 downstream IRP13 Mauricio  m 4 Usocoello N SI 22.03.2013 
13  - IRP14 Jorge  m 3 Semillas de Agua Y ID continuous 
14 - IRP15 Carmen  f 3 WWF Y ID continuous 
15 - IRP16 Beth-Sua f 1 WWF Y ID continuous 
16 - IRP17 Jorge  m 4 CIAT Y ID continuous 
 
 *Codes for age   **Code for type of 
interview/discussion 
 Code Age 
category 
  Code  Type 
 1 18-29   SSI Semi-structured 
interview 
 2 30-39   ID Informal 
discussion  
 3 40-49     
 4 50-59     
 5 60+     
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Appendix  H: Timeline of Fieldwork 
 
Interval Activity 
18.09.2012 - 
23.09.2012 
Participant observation; Transect walks; Informal discussions; 
Situational observation during the BSM negotiation process;  
12.12.2012 - 
16.02.2012 
Participant observation; Semi-structured interviews; Informal 
discussions 
26.01.2013- 
30.01.2013 
Semi-structured interviews; Informal discussions; Group 
discussion 1 
19.03.2013 - 
24.03.2013 
Semi-structured interviews; Group discussion 2; Presentation of 
preliminary results 1 (Ibague) 
24.04.2013 Presentation of preliminary results 2 (Cali) 
Aug-13 Presentation of final results (Ibague) 
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Appendix  I: Interview Guide - Farmers 
 
I. Preliminary thoughts 
(Space for socialization; presenting my research aim and the terms of reference; asking for 
recording permission – if participant feels uncomfortable being recorded, ask if note-taking is 
ok; also ask whether it’s ok to use quotes in the final paper).  
 
II. Information about the research participant (to the extent that she/he agrees to 
disclose the information) 
Name: 
Age / Age category: 
Location in the watershed (including village/municipality): 
Role in the watershed: 
 
III. Agriculture and livelihoods 
1. What is the total area you have under cultivation? 
2. Do you own the land you are cultivating or are you renting it? 
3. What crops are you cultivating? Do they use a lot of water? (Insist on seasonality, 
irrigation systems) 
4. What are the main challenges you face as a farmer? 
5. What would you improve in your farm, if you had the opportunity?  
6. Would you see yourself switching to other types of activities? How? Why? What activity 
would you choose? 
 
IV. Membership in a group/association 
1. Are you part of any group/association? Why did you decide to join/Why not?  
2. (If the case) can you tell me more about the activities within the group, about your role in 
the group 
 
V. Water  
1. Let’s move now to another topic, which is water…Why do you think water is important 
and what should humans do about it? 
2. What problems related to water do you face?  
3. What about the other community/watershed inhabitants? Do they face the same 
challenges as you have? Why? How could you explain this…? 
4. How do the problems of other (associated with water) affect you?  
5. Are these problems recent or have they always been there? What spawned them?  
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6. What did you use to do to cope with the problems? What did the others use to do? 
7. Can you elaborate more on how you are protecting the watershed through your daily 
activities?  
 
VI. Neighbours  
1. Who are your neighbours? How would you describe your relationship with them? 
2. Tell me about the other community inhabitants? Do you ever get in contact with them? If 
yes, how? … Do they face the same problems as farmers? Why/Why not? What makes 
them different? 
3. Do you trust in the other community members, state institutions, private actors, NGOs? 
What makes you trust/mistrust them? 
4. Can you tell me about any past conflicts of interest / tensions over water in your 
community? Where you part?  How where they solved…? 
 
VII. BSMs  
8. What means for you sharing benefits from water?  
9. Are you familiar with the recent initiative if X, Y, Z to buy land in te upper part of the 
watershed and to declare it protected area? Can you tell me more about that, what you 
think about it, why is it good to protect these areas? (If not, I introduce the subject and we 
start discussing) 
10. Did you have any role in this initiative? 
11. What are the benefits (and costs) you derive from this initiative? How does these new 
arrangements affect you  
12. How do you think the problems in the watershed will be solved with this initiative?  
13. How do you think past conflicts that you mentioned will be solved with this initiative? 
14. How have the relationships between community and the other actors changed after this 
initiative? 
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Appendix  J: Interview Guide- Institutional representatives (public, private, civil society) 
 
VIII. Preliminary thoughts 
(Space for socialization: presenting my research aim and the terms of reference; asking for 
recording permission – if participant feels uncomfortable being recorded, ask if note-taking is 
ok; also ask if it’s allowed to use quotes from this discussion in the final paper).  
 
IX. Information about the research participant (to the extent that she/he agrees to disclose 
the information) 
Name: 
Age / Age category: 
Location in the watershed (including village/municipality): 
Role in the watershed: 
 
X. Basic information about the institution she/he represents 
1. What is the institution’s role in the watershed? 
2. How does the institution/unit function?  
3. How are communities/other actors in the watershed benefiting from the institution’s 
activities? How are they affected by the decisions taken in you institution?  
4. How are they engaged in the decision-making process?  
 
III. Environment/Water on the agenda  
1. Why is watershed protection and conservation important? 
2. Tell me more about the problems you see in the watershed… (…in terms of pressures…) 
Who is affected most? Who can be hold responsible and why?  
3. Tell me about the activities the institution carries out in order to address these 
problems/to improve the situation…  
4. What can/should be improved in watershed management? Why?  
5. Can you think about any particular tensions related to water, prior to the development of 
the BSMs? Which?  
 
IV. Cooperation with other actors  
1. Tell me about some other important actors in the watershed – users, providers, decision-
makers? How do they affect the water resources? 
2. I would like you to tell me more about how the institution cooperates with other 
watershed actors (in activities related to watershed conservation and protection)…  
 
V. BSMs 
1. In your opinion, what is benefit-sharing in the context of watershed management? 
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2. Please tell me a little bit about the initiative to protect the upstream area – what is your 
opinion on that?  
3. How is the institution affected by these mechanisms? How are watershed inhabitants and 
other actors affected/ benefited? 
4. Did you have any role in the design process of the BSM? If yes, which? What about the 
implementation process? 
5. Looking at each category of actor in the watershed… How would you describe the 
changes that these mechanisms brought in the actor’s behaviour? 
6. How would you describe the situation now compared to the situation prior to the BSMs 
in terms of decision-making power? Are there groups who are more empowered? Which? 
7. Do you feel there is more cooperation? If yes/no, in what sense? 
8. What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanisms? 
 
